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Abstract
This article examines the European Union's (EU) approach to energy 
security on the example of its natural gas imports from Russia, the largest 
supplier of gas to European markets. Two major projects, Nord Stream in 
the Northern and Western part of the EU, and Nabucco in South-Central 
Europe, demonstrate opposing energy security strategies, seemingly at 
odds with the EU objective of achieving energy independence from 
Russia. The question arises: Are these strategies sustainable? How can 
they be reconciled and pursued under a common policy? The main 
argument is that such conflicting sub-regional policy initiatives are 
amenable to progressive realignment and serve common security 
objectives. The article examines the Nord Stream and Nabucco pipelines 
in the context of the Third Energy Package, a set of policy instruments for 
the creation of an EU-wide internal energy market. It demonstrates that 
the energy security strategies pursued through Nord Stream and Nabucco 
fit well with the logic of the internal market reflected in premises of 
flexibility and efficiency. The article concludes that the security of the 
EU's energy market may be pursued in practice by applying different 
formulas relying on a variable mix of networks, partnerships, and market 
integration with non-members.
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Introduction
Natural gas is poised for a bright yet complex future, also for 
geopolitical reasons. The global gas market, very young at present, will 
expand significantly, aided by climate worries, growing power 
demands, and new LNG technology. Yet [...] …geopolitical difficulties 
will exist regardless.1
The global energy trade stands at the intersection of business and politics. 
Access to natural resources is a matter of national security affecting all 
vital economic, defense, infrastructural, and social systems of the state. 
Following the pattern of industrial development in the 20th century, 
which relied primarily on oil and resulted in a recurrent rush for the 
"black gold," the turn of the 21st century marked the rush for "blue 
energy," that is natural gas. A base product for many applications across 
industry, transport, and consumption, natural gas has reached global rel-
evance. Cleaner and more efficient than oil and coal, it has important 
advantages in terms of cost-effectiveness and environmental sustainabil-
ity. However, natural gas is not substantively a more secure and reliable 
energy resource, despite its economic and technological qualities. The 
uneven distribution of the sources of natural gas globally, inflexible and 
cost-intensive means of delivery, and high concentrations of consumption 
due to geographic and population patterns create multiple asymmetric 
dependencies between producers and consumers. Trade in natural gas is 
not based on comparative advantage only. As most observers note, it lacks 
some of the important features of conventional markets. Natural gas often 
involves non-market price formation for end users. Prices for spot and 
long-term contracts differ widely, regional concentrations of suppliers 
and consumers are a source of interdependence and vulnerability and, in 
the absence of good relations between exporters and importers, trade in 
natural gas may be brought to a halt regardless of the underlying eco-
nomic benefits it offers.2 As most international deliveries rely on pipe-
lines, the participation of transit countries complicates the relationship 
between suppliers and consumers with a potential for significant political 
ramifications.3
The enmeshing of cost-benefit, reliability, affordability, and sustainability 
concerns in the provision of natural gas is captured by the concept of 
energy security. The latter represents a shorthand expression for objec-
tives that require policy action, simultaneously reducing import depen-
dence without compromising economic growth, addressing climate 
change issues, securing effective supply routes, and minimizing risks of 
political destabilization.4 The European Union (EU) is an example of an 
energy market that promotes such broadened understanding of energy 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 5, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss3/7
DOI: <p>http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.5.3.4</p>
European Strategies for Energy Security in the Natural Gas Market
53
security to address more than the problem of dependence on a sole source 
of deliveries, the security of transportation, and the sustainability of sup-
ply in view of changes in the structure of demand. Issues of environmen-
tal sustainability and the de-carbonization of the energy system form an 
integral component of the European conception of energy security.5 
While the practical implementation of such policy ideas is understandably 
multi-dimensional, it is also inherently contradictory and politically con-
tested. The policy mix includes often mutually exclusive approaches to 
dealing with energy issues in the EU's internal market, including the 
availability and reliability of supply, energy independence and coopera-
tion, and economic efficiency and environmental sustainability.
The multiplicity of policy actions is often criticized for lacking common 
conceptual foundations and value added in terms of energy security.6 
There is a widely shared assumption that the EU needs to take a more 
effective position on the international stage in order to secure its energy 
needs.7 Some observers emphasize the need for a common energy policy 
based on the diversification of sources and suppliers, which would reduce 
Europe's external energy dependence. Others propose the decoupling of 
the political from the technical and economic dimensions of energy pol-
icy, in an effort to boost efficiency, market integration, and environmental 
sustainability.
This article examines the EU's approaches to energy security on the exam-
ple of its natural gas imports from Russia, the largest supplier of gas to 
European markets, and therefore a source of energy dependence. The 
prevalent EU policy mix vis-à-vis Russia is an effort to reconcile the 
diverse interests and often mutually exclusive strategies of public and pri-
vate actors, member states and EU institutions, which simultaneously 
depend on and exclude Russia as a reliable supply source. The launch of 
two major initiatives, Nord Stream and The Southern Gas Corridor 
(Nabucco), demonstrates such opposing strategies, seemingly at odds 
with the objective of achieving energy independence from Russia. Both 
projects are visionary, designed to cover the long-term needs of the EU 
member states.
Nord Stream increases European energy supply by diversifying the routes 
which carry natural gas to Western Europe. While nominally the pipeline 
removes transit states, increases the efficiency of supply, and lowers the 
opportunities for politicization of deliveries, it also increases the EU's 
dependence on Russian gas by increasing the volume of imports into 
Western Europe without diversifying the sources of supply.8
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Objectives of enhancing energy security in the south of Europe have 
implemented the opposite strategy. The Nabucco pipeline was designed to 
diversify supply by excluding deliveries of Russian gas. The project relies 
on a large number of sources in the Caspian Sea region, Northern Iraq, 
and possibly Iran, none of which guarantees long-term supply, and 
includes several transit states. These conflicting strategies are pursued 
against the background of an EU-wide consensus on common principles 
of energy security. The lack of consistency in the case of the northern and 
the southern route is at odds with the common objectives of affordability, 
reliability, and sustainability of natural gas imports into the EU. The 
question arises: Are these strategies sustainable? How can they be recon-
ciled and pursued under a common policy? Is there a common denomina-
tor between the increase in gas imports from Russia through Nord Stream 
and the diversification of suppliers through Nabucco without guaranteed 
resource availability for the Southern Gas Corridor?
The main argument of this article is that the value added of such 
conflicting policy approaches should not be considered as a trade-off 
between their individual cost-benefit calculation of gains, risks, and 
energy independence. Sub-regional solutions may not be amenable to a 
one-size-fits-all EU energy security policy but they benefit from 
progressive realignment in order to contribute to common security 
objectives. In order to demonstrate the value of this seemingly piecemeal 
adjustment, the article examines the Nord Stream and Nabucco pipelines 
in the context of the Third Energy Package, a set of policy instruments for 
the creation of an EU-wide internal energy market, in force since March 
2011. The evidence shows that the diverse sub-regional and national 
strategies in the natural gas sector are reconciled and gradually adjusted 
through the logic of the internal market through premises of competition, 
networks, and external partnerships with neighboring states and 
suppliers. It concludes that, despite an underlying rationale of minimizing 
dependence on imports from Russia, energy security in the EU natural 
gas market should be derived from market integration, investment in 
infrastructure, and policy convergence, beyond measures of the physical 
security of supply and demand and/or supplier diversification.
The Sub-Regional View of Energy Security in the EU 
in the Context of Imports from Russia: North vs. 
South, East-West, and Offshore/Onshore
The EU-Russia energy relationship does not conform to a clear-cut policy 
model. Western Europe has pursued a strategy of limiting its energy 
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dependence on Russia since the 1980s. The debate has sought to deter-
mine whether the focus should be on diversifying energy supplies; that is, 
reducing Russia's share as a source of energy imports, or on diversifying 
the routes of supply while relying on Russia as a key supplier.9 The 
enmeshing of political and economic factors has prevented the EU mem-
ber states individually and multilaterally to develop a common long-term 
approach to managing their trade relations with Russia in the natural gas 
sector.
Unequal production, consumption, and import patterns among the EU 
member states make joint decision-making in the area of energy difficult. 
There are systematic or tightly organized sub-regional markets. For the 
last 20 years, EU-based consumption of natural gas has almost doubled. 
The EU imports over 60 percent of the quantities of natural gas it needs. 
Imports reached 391.2 million tons of oil equivalent (TOE) in 2011, of 
which 302.8 million TOE to the Eurozone.10 The Russian Federation is 
the country of origin for around one-third of natural gas imports (intra-
EU trade excluded).11 Despite a long-standing commitment to energy 
security, natural gas dependence in the EU stood at 60 percent in 2011. It 
rose 2.3 percent in the Eurozone to 74.6 percent.12
The rise in world energy prices, instability in the Middle East, and the 
challenge of reducing the environmental impact of energy production and 
consumption have led the EU member states to include the diversification 
of energy supply among their main priorities.13 Such trends are cotermi-
nous with estimates that Russia will remain an important global supplier 
of natural gas. Despite an old transit system, Russia has significant assets 
to transport natural gas to a large number of European markets. The 
northern route includes both onshore and offshore pipelines. The central 
route connects Southern Russia to Europe via the Ukraine. The southern 
route carries natural gas from Southern Russia to a number of adjacent 
countries. This route permits to expand Russia's links to suppliers in Cen-
tral Asia with transport of natural gas from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
and Kazakhstan and exports to Ukraine and Turkey (via the Blue Stream 
pipeline).14
The significant share of the EU-Russia energy trade in global flows histor-
ically suggests that the objective of minimizing the EU's energy depen-
dence on Russia is amenable to market-based approaches which would 
balance existing demand by means of trade diversification. At the same 
time, typical of the nature of the gas market, the EU's imports from Russia 
are affected by the quality of their political relations. The EU-Russia 
Energy Dialogue, launched in 2000 as a framework for addressing trade 
policy issues, is an example of energy diplomacy, whose main objective is 
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to maintain stability in the bilateral relationship, while promoting the 
process of regional integration within the EU. At the same time, the EU-
Russia relationship is subject also to the geopolitical premises of energy 
security, which include vulnerability, competition, resource conflicts, and 
instability.
The enmeshing of market-based and geopolitical approaches to energy 
security in Europe are reflected in the strategies, which private and public 
actors across the EU pursue on a bilateral and multilateral basis to secure 
their energy needs. Although demand for natural gas in Europe is growing 
slowly as a result of stagnant economic conditions, import dependence is 
expected to increase due to falling production from local sources of sup-
ply. The European Commission foresees an annual import gap of 200 bil-
lion cubic meters (BCM) natural gas by 2025 as a result of increased 
reliance on gas consumption, as opposed to other fossil fuels, and limited 
natural reserves.15
The level of dependence on imports from Russia varies widely, in view of 
differences in terms of size and growth potential of national energy and 
natural gas markets. The common preference of securing a reliable long-
term supply of natural gas, therefore, imposes different priorities for the 
EU member states. Ensuring the availability and sustainability of supply 
to meet a growing demand is the main objective in the large Western 
European markets, such as Germany, France, and Italy. The large number 
of smaller markets in Central and Eastern Europe are characterized by 
fragmentation and high dependence on energy imports from Russia. The 
primary objective of these countries is to minimize the vulnerability of 
their gas imports by means of diversification of sources of supply and 
delivery systems through access to EU-based infrastructure and 
resources. Furthermore, given the pronounced commitment of the Euro-
pean countries to environmental protection, all EU member states share 
the view that energy security is accomplished through environmentally 
sustainable sources of energy production.16 Environmental concerns add 
an additional layer of requirements for the reliability and efficiency of gas 
supply.
While most European countries are apprehensive about increasing 
imports from Russia given its quasi-monopolistic position in the Euro-
pean gas markets, growing reliance on import and established transit 
routes make the objective of diversification of supply less than automatic 
or intuitive. Even though energy security is a shared EU objective, it is 
implemented through a matrix of diverse country-specific priorities, not 
necessarily amenable to compatibility, synergy, or complementarities. 
The two principal natural gas projects, Nord Stream and Nabucco, are 
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aimed at meeting demand for natural gas at the sub-regional level in the 
EU, and demonstrate significant differences in terms of actors, strategies, 
and commitment to reducing import dependence on Russia.
Nord Stream
In 2000, the Nord Stream project for the delivery of natural gas from Rus-
sia to Germany (then called the North European Gas Pipeline) was 
included in the Trans-European Network-Energy (TEN-E) due to its 
importance for European energy security.17 The Nord Stream consortium 
was created in 2001 as a joint venture between Russia's principal gas 
company Gazprom, whose majority shareholder is the Russian state, and 
Wintershall and Ruhrgas, whose parent companies are BASF and E.ON, 
respectively. The Dutch gas infrastructure company N.V. Nederlandse 
Gasunie joined the consortium in 2008. Gazprom acquired 51 percent of 
the company, BASF 20 percent, E.ON 20 percent, and Gasunie nine per-
cent.18 The project was recognized as a project of European interest by the 
European Parliament and the EU Council of Ministers in 2006.19 Nord 
Stream has been designed as two parallel pipelines, each with an annual 
gas transport capacity of 27.5 BCM. By 2030, 11 percent of Europe's natu-
ral gas will be transported through the new route.20
The construction of Nord Stream began in April 2010. The pipeline links 
Russia's gas deposits to Germany and the European energy market 
directly, bypassing transit countries. It advances energy security needs on 
a commercial, investment, and efficiency basis. Even though the EU insti-
tutions publicly support the Nord Stream pipeline as a means of increas-
ing the energy resources available to European economies, it fails to 
resolve concerns about the common European energy policy and security. 
The project depends exclusively on deliveries by Gazprom. The company 
already supplies a quarter of Europe's natural gas. With growing import 
volumes, Gazprom will increase its leverage on the European economy.21 
Although the pipeline is a strategic step toward enhancing energy secu-
rity, it also increases Europe's dependence on Russia. Furthermore, it 
affects the distribution of benefits among participating actors and results 
in repositioning between consumers and transit states.22
States that foresee a loss of national influence or security as a result of 
Russia's move into the Baltic region voice a variety of specific concerns, 
collectively undermining the contribution of the pipeline to the security of 
supply. Countries bordering the Baltic Sea are sensitive to Russian pres-
ence in their territorial waters or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs). The 
Nord Stream passes through the EEZs of Denmark, Finland, Germany, 
Russia, and Sweden, while bypassing those of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
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and Poland. Such selective inclusion made the project controversial.23 
Key transit states for Russian gas imports into Europe face another type 
of security problem. As Nord Stream approaches its full capacity to trans-
port 55 BCM of gas through the Baltic Sea, the importance of the onshore 
Yamal-Europe pipeline is expected to diminish. The Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline has the capacity to transport 33 BCM of Russian gas per year. Its 
route passes through Belarus and branches off into Yamal I, going 
through Poland to Germany, and Yamal II, which transits through 
Ukraine and Slovakia to reach Austria. Thanks to Nord Stream, Russia no 
longer relies exclusively on territorial pipelines for gas exports to Western 
European markets, giving less consideration to transit states in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
The security implications of Nord Stream are complicated by an array of 
environmental concerns regarding the construction and operation of the 
project, which collectively have introduced uncertainty about its overall 
ecological impact.24 Parallel proposals for the construction of alternative 
onshore pipelines made by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland suggest 
that the strategy of eliminating transit states through inter-firm coopera-
tion and market-based approaches is insufficient to improve energy secu-
rity for all actors individually, despite aggregate efficiency gains.25
The further expansion of Nord Stream is likely to increase overall depen-
dence on Russia, and not only in absolute terms. Gazprom's growing 
influence as a producer increases its leverage in determining the scope of 
supply, which could lead to unpredictability, price volatility, poor 
resource management, and ultimately, political instability. From the per-
spective of security of supply, diversifying the delivery routes through 
pipelines, such as Nord Stream, without diversifying the supplier does not 
alleviate such risks.
Southern Gas Corridor
The Southern Gas Corridor is an initiative for the supply of natural gas 
from the Caspian and Middle Eastern regions to Europe, which follows 
the opposite strategy, that of diversification of suppliers to exclude Rus-
sia. Nabucco is the most important project for gas supply encompassed by 
the Corridor, which includes also the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), 
designed to connect Greece, Albania and Italy. Together, the projects of 
the Southern Corridor will provide the necessary transportation capacity 
to deliver 60 to 120 BCM per year of Caspian and Central Asian natural 
gas.
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The Nabucco pipeline started as a political initiative between Turkey, Bul-
garia, Romania, Hungary and Austria in 2002. The project is designed to 
transport up to 31 BCM of gas over a distance of 3900 km from the Cas-
pian region (Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) to Baumgarten, a European 
gas hub in Austria. The pipeline will meet the growing needs of the region 
of Southern and South-Eastern Europe for natural gas and is expected to 
increase the level of predictability of supply by means of diversification of 
the source.
The Nabucco project has been the object of a number of modifications. 
The original shareholders: The Hungarian MOL oil and gas company, the 
Bulgarian Energy Holding (BEH), the Turkish Botas company, Austrian 
OMV, German RWE, and Romanian Transgaz each acquired a 16.67 per-
cent stake. MOL's relationship with OMV, the de facto leader of the 
Nabucco project, was strained as a result of OMV's decision to sell its 21.2 
percent stake in MOL to the Russian energy company Surgutneftegas for 
$1.9 billion in March 2009. RWE threatened to abandon the project in 
2011. In May 2012, BP—the company developing the Shah Deniz II natu-
ral gas field in Azerbaijan, which alone was expected to provide Nabucco 
with around 10 BCM natural gas—also announced that it would leave the 
project. The initial estimate of the cost of Nabucco of around €8 billion 
has been repeatedly increased. The start of the construction was delayed, 
and is envisaged for 2013 instead of 2011.With deliveries originally 
expected to begin in 2017 and now postponed until 2018, the overall scale 
of the project has diminished. While the European Commission has 
worked to establish a productive multilateral framework for the Nabucco 
pipeline by building a consensus among the transit and supplier states, it 
has yet to resolve issues related to the availability of supply. A reduced 
version of the project, Nabucco West, constructed over a distance of 1,300 
km, will use either existing infrastructure on the territory of Turkey or the 
projected Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), in order to simplify con-
struction and avoid duplication in view of the lack of supply. The transfer 
of shares between shareholders and changing preferences for participa-
tion demonstrate that there is a continuing search for the optimization of 
the project, and for re-negotiation of the distribution of benefits among 
suppliers, consumers, and transit countries. Nabucco has not resolved the 
issue about the complementarity between suppliers, access to the 
resources of the Caspian Sea region, and the potential participation of 
Russia and Iran as suppliers on a competitive basis.26
Russia's practical exclusion as a supply source for Nabucco, despite its 
importance as an exporter of natural gas from Central Asia, led to a Rus-
sian counter proposal for the South Stream project, a direct competitor of 
Nabucco and of the entire Southern Gas Corridor. South Stream, expected 
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to become operational by the end of 2015, will carry annually up to 63 
BCM of natural gas from Russia to Southern and Central Europe. The 
pipeline will connect Russia with Bulgaria via the Black Sea and then split 
into a northern leg, going through Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia 
to Austria and Northern Italy, and a southern leg going to Southern Italy 
through Greece. Similarly to Nord Stream, South Stream is based on the 
concept of diversification of routes by eliminating transit countries. South 
Stream bypasses the Ukraine, currently a route for 80 percent of Russia's 
deliveries of natural gas to Europe. The European Commission has 
responded with determination to pursue energy independence from Rus-
sia by prioritizing Nabucco as the most significant project under the 
Southern Gas Corridor and pointing out that the technical requirements 
for security are a condition for EU support for South Stream. Further-
more, while the Commission views South Stream as an alternative route 
of supply, it also points out to the commitment to reducing the EU's over-
all dependence on natural gas through de-carbonization of the energy sys-
tem and development of new and renewable sources of energy.27
The politics of increasing dependence on supplies from Russia through 
Nord Stream and the search for independence from Russia through 
Nabucco reveal the complexity of achieving energy security as a combina-
tion of market-based and geopolitical approaches. A political approach to 
energy security by means of balancing and international bargaining may 
be inadequate to correct for the deficiencies of the two pipelines, as both 
Nord Stream and Nabucco represent suboptimal solutions for energy 
security. A market-based approach in the case of Nord Stream is limited 
to the physical security of supply, and does not preclude asymmetrical 
relationships between suppliers and consumers in the energy market. 
Increasing energy independence may not increase energy security. By 
contrast, arrangements such as Nabucco, which pursue geopolitical bal-
ancing and energy independence, are less likely to achieve the security of 
physical supply. They are exposed to the risk of multiple dependencies 
and overinvestment in infrastructure, thus compromising the efficiency 
and affordability objectives of energy security.
Viewed through the lens of the policy framework governing the EU's 
internal energy market, the strategies of increasing the volume of imports 
from Russia into the largest markets of Western Europe and excluding it 
from deliveries to Central and Southern Europe are not necessarily a com-
promise and a trade-off of energy security. Despite their mutually oppos-
ing premises, the market-based and geopolitical strategies pursued in the 
Nord Stream and Nabucco projects are compatible with the premises of 
the EU internal energy market. As the following section demonstrates, the 
application of policy instruments ensuring competition, interconnectivity, 
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solidarity, and cooperation in the natural gas market provides a corrective 
ensuring the progressive alignment of the two projects with the objectives 
of energy security in the EU.
The Policy Mix for Upgrading the EU's Energy 
Security: Market Efficiency, Solidarity, and Energy 
Cooperation
The role of energy in the politics of European integration cannot be over-
stated. The formulation of a common energy policy is one of the historical 
objectives that go back to the EU's roots as a common market and a sys-
tem of joint decision-making. The energy system was placed at the center 
of the peace narrative of regional integration in Europe in the 1950s, 
embedded in the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community 
(1951). A common energy policy was one of the founding themes of the 
European Economic Community, reflected in the objective of securing 
"more abundant energy at a cheaper price for the European econo-
mies."28 The EU's energy market and geopolitical status have changed 
significantly since then. Despite policy innovation in the 1980s when 
cooperation with Russia increased access to sources of natural gas for the 
EU member states, most studies identify the Europe's rising dependency 
on imports from Russia as a source of economic and political risk. Con-
cerns for energy security, defined as quasi-synonymous to energy inde-
pendence from Russia, became even more prominent in the wake of the 
2004–2007 East-European enlargement. A statement on energy policy in 
the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (Lisbon Treaty, 
TfEU) reflects the shared preference of the EU member states for a com-
mon energy policy, implemented by means of an internal market, the 
security of energy supply, efficiency and energy savings, and the develop-
ment of new and renewable forms of energy.29
The Third Package
Building upon treaty commitments and the long-term strategy of creating 
an internal market for energy, the so-called Third Package of EU legisla-
tion on the energy market (2009) formulates a set of rules for the creation 
of a truly competitive energy market to be completed by 2014.30 The 
Package posits a link between safe, secure, sustainable, and affordable 
energy and economic competitiveness, as well as between the internal and 
external aspects of the energy market. This policy innovation marks a 
shift from an approach to energy security based on energy diplomacy and 
individual high-efficiency projects to market integration and policy cohe-
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siveness.31 The new rules for the organization of the sector encourage 
integration of the national energy markets by minimizing market frag-
mentation while seeking to guarantee competition by unbundling genera-
tion, production, and supply interests.
The twin propositions of market decoupling and solidarity bind together 
the two principal dimensions of energy security: Diversification of suppli-
ers and diversification of routes, which had remained separate in prior 
policy approaches to energy security, including Nord Stream and 
Nabucco. The separation of production, supply, and delivery interests 
prevents vertical integration in the gas market and limits the opportuni-
ties for monopolistic dominance. The principle of decoupling has affected 
Gazprom's position in Nord Stream by requiring the separation of gas 
sales from transportation and ensuring access to transportation grids for 
third parties. The instruments of energy policy now correct for the subop-
timal effects of Nord Stream in the area of market concentration and 
dependence, which conventional political approaches, such as rebalanc-
ing and linkage politics may be unable to resolve.
Russia and Gazprom have opposed the Third Package and its retrospec-
tive effect. Gazprom has argued that the new rules of decoupling and 
third-party access will divert investment away from the planned expan-
sion of Nord Stream through the construction of a second pipe.32 In real-
ity, the separation of interests between export sales, delivery, and 
infrastructure prevents Gazprom from acquiring a monopolistic position 
in the market through vertical integration, maintains a competitive mar-
ket environment, and limits the extent of Europe's dependence on Gaz-
prom for investment in its transportation grid.
The proposition that a fully integrated energy market requires a devel-
oped external dimension has added new policy instruments for the diver-
sification of supply sources and routes. The emphasis is on coordination, 
network integration, overcoming the energy isolation of specific regions 
in the EU, investment in infrastructure, and strengthening external part-
nerships.33 The external dimension of the EU's internal energy market 
relies on the economics of market competition, the politics of market 
access, and energy efficiency.34 The Third Package thus permits reformu-
lation of the objective to reduce EU energy dependence on Russia into a 
more complex policy mix. Besides conventional methods based on politi-
cal choices for the diversification of suppliers, the Third Package pro-
motes networks and investment projects within the EU internal energy 
market. Competition in the area of investment in infrastructure promotes 
the diversity of sources, suppliers, transport routes, and transport meth-
ods. Despite the fact that Nabucco and South Stream compete directly for 
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the same pool of natural gas resources, the security of supply is consider-
ably improved through investment in alternative supply/transit routes 
and reverse-flow projects, thereby allowing natural gas to flow freely 
across borders within the internal market.35 Such measures enhance the 
effects of diversification of supply, anticipated through Nabucco, by inte-
grating existing networks in the internal market based on interconnec-
tions, solidarity, and integration. The gradual rebalancing between the 
internal and external dimensions of the market thus acts to correct for the 
deficiencies of individual projects while improving policy cohesiveness.
Conclusion
The seemingly conflicting objectives of Nabucco and Nord Stream and the 
piecemeal approach with which they have been implemented demon-
strates that, outside rhetoric, there is no single strategy of accomplishing 
energy security in Western and East-Central Europe. The northern strat-
egy relies on market-based economic mechanisms of inter-firm coopera-
tion and bilateral energy diplomacy, and achieves diversification of gas 
transit routes by eliminating transit states and separating the political 
from economic aspects of the gas trade. In the south, the EU endorsed a 
strategy of diversifying the sources of supply by eliminating Russia as a 
supplier under the Nabucco project. This article has argued that such 
diverse policy approaches are compatible within the policy frameworks of 
the EU internal natural gas market. Neither a system of balancing, nor 
market efficiency per se is fully adequate to the needs of energy security. 
The security of the EU's internal energy market may be pursued in prac-
tice by applying different formulas.
Whether pipelines adopt alternative transit routes and increase market 
efficiency by reducing transit fees and third-party influence, or opt for 
supplier diversification, potential risks remain. Such risks are systemic in 
a global energy market in which long-term demand exceeds current pro-
jections of supply. Neither the EU, nor Russia can isolate themselves from 
market trends. The key challenge for the EU is to resolve the efficiency 
and availability aspect of energy security. For Russia, it is to abandon 
monopoly through decoupling and cooperation. More complex measures, 
such as growing economic interdependence binding together a multiplic-
ity of actors and projects in the EU internal energy market, may be better 
positioned to address the geopolitical vulnerabilities of Europe's natural 
gas imports.
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This conclusion fits well with a common EU policy paradigm of energy 
security defined as an increasingly comprehensive (multidimensional, 
integrating across sources and routes of supply) and cooperative concept, 
exceeding the format of an energy dialogue between suppliers and con-
sumers to instead rely on networks, partnerships, and market integration 
with non-members. That there is no single policy blueprint for achieving 
energy security but rather a piecemeal, network approach of gradual inte-
gration of measures and actors is reflected in the selective application of 
energy diplomacy, geopolitical, and market-based approaches reconciling 
and upgrading the preferences of private and public actors, importers and 
exports, consumers and transit states. The process is one of progressive 
alignment to the modalities of market competition and efficiency.
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